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HIGH ART, FoLK ART, AND OTHER SocIAL DISTINCTIONS: 
CANONS, GENEALOGY AND THE CONSTRUCTION 
OF AESTHETICS 
Gary Shapiro 
Most discussions of the arts by critics 
and philosophers could be characterized 
in terms of a rather studied neglect of 
folk and popular art. This neglect is 
hardly absolute, however, for it is impor-
tant in order to articulate a specific 
conception of aesthetic taste, beauty, or 
style to contrast the standard being used 
or praised with some other, less desir-
able, even degraded way of producing or 
appreciating something similar. It is per-
haps more than a historical coincidence 
that the formation of the modern concept 
of taste and aesthetic judgment, in the 
eighteenth century, coincides roughly 
with the discovery and valorization of 
folk poetry and folk culture by the early 
romantics. In fact the historical connec-
tions are often quite close. Immanuel 
Kant is generally credited with having 
articulated the most comprehensive and 
influential statement of the modern con-
ception of taste and aesthetic judgment, 
in the Critique of judgment of 1790. There 
Kant argues that to judge something to 
be beautiful is to pronounce simply upon 
its formal values; in particular a genuine 
judgment of taste is to be distinguished 
from any reponse to that which gratifies 
our appetites or interests. At the same 
time that Kant was developing this sig-
nificant statement of the aesthetic point 
of view, his former student J. G. Herder 
was celebrating the culture of the Volk 
and publishing their ballads and stories. 
Now it might be claimed that there is no 
inconsistency between these perspec-
tives; it could be said either that produc-
tions of folk-art may meet the same 
aesthetic standards of disinterested 
pleasure which obtain for taste generally, 
or one might admit that folk art did not 
as a rule meet such standards but that it 
ought to be valued in some different way, 
for example, as the expression of a 
culture or way of life rather than as an 
object of aesthetic appreciation. Yet this 
is a route not usually taken; friends of 
folk art and of higher art seem to be at 
one in recognizing that they involve 
quite different standards of excellence. 
Still, one might ask whether these differ-
ences might simply co-exist in a peaceful 
fashion; perhaps they are so different 
that comparisons are irrelevant or mis-
leading. Nevertheless, the history of dis-
course about the arts is marked by either 
explicit or implicit polemics against one 
or the other of these forms. For the 
differences in question are, of course, not 
simply natural differences but social dis-
tinctions. It is precisely by affirming 
one's taste in art (or one's general cul-
tural taste) that one affirms one's own 
value; the differences spoken of here are 
distinctions, in the sense in which good 
taste is said to be a sign of a distin-
guished person, a man or woman of 
distinction. The object of this explora-
tory study is to observe some of these 
differences and their associated forms of 
distinction at work in the discourse of 
aesthetics and criticism. The treatment 
will be partial and episodic; that is, I will 
74 University of Kansas Publications in Anthropology 
be examining only a few thinkers drawn 
from an even smaller number of national 
traditions. The limitation is a conse-
quence of both the limits of my own 
reading and of the fact that while there is 
much said about high art, folk art, or 
popular art, comparatively little has 
been written about the way in which the 
formation of an audience or standard for 
one form involves the making of distinc-
tions between itself and others. 
Andre Malraux, whose The Voices of 
Silence is perhaps the most exhilarating 
and richest account of the new world of 
twentieth century art and the meta-
morphoses that it has produced in our 
understanding of the art of the past, felt 
it necessary to begin one of his essays by 
claiming that folk art no longer exists. In 
''Art, Popular Art, and the Illusion of 
the Folk,'' he pronounces this exclusion: 
Folk art no longer exists because the 
"folk" no longer exists. The modern 
masses, bound even in rural places to urban 
civilization, are as different from the crafts-
men and the peasants of the great monar-
chies as from the people of the Middle Ages. 
The word ''people,'' when Cardinal de Retz 
applied it to the Parisians, already sounded 
false; if the Cardinal had not limited himself 
to Paris, he would have said bourgeoisie or 
populace. The people that bought religious 
images and sang popular songs was born of 
the oldest civilizations of the earth, would 
have been partly at home in them, and could 
scarcely read (Malroux 1967:29). 
It might seem that even if folk art no 
longer exists, it could still be a legitimate 
object of both academic study and artis-
tic appreciation. Why can't we respond 
to English folk ballads even if there is no 
longer a living tradition that is continu-
ous with their earliest appearance? Here 
Malraux woul9 say that the question of 
such survival and tradition is all impor-
tant; for he sees our attitude to art as 
necessarily constituted by the prevailing 
institutions, attitudes and practices of 
the twentieth century art-world. On his 
account this art-world is an ''imaginary 
museum" in which all art of the past has 
been stripped of its earlier social, re-
ligious and cultural contexts in order to 
become objects that should be appreci-
ated for their formal interest and for 
their exhibition of the nobility of the 
creative human spirit as it triumphs over 
death by the artistic ''annexation'' of 
reality. If our understanding of art is 
structured and limited by the art-world 
that we live in, and if the "imaginary 
museum" is indeed the basic form of 
that art-world then the death of folk art 
would bring with it the end of the pos-
sibility of assuming an attitude toward 
even the folk art of the past that could be 
like that of past folk cultures. If there is 
no living folk art, so the argument goes, 
there cannot be any appreciation or un-
derstanding of folk art except through 
the transformative perspective of the 
''imaginary museum.'' 
This argument is far from being 
completely opposed to the views of the 
romantic celebrants of folk art. They too 
tended to suppose that a genuine contact 
with folk art was available to them only 
in so far as there was a living tradition 
that could transmit that art to the pre-
sent day. It was important, they thought, 
that their inquiries were not merely anti-
quarian but part of a continuous, if 
historically changing, culture. Certainly 
the Grimms believed something like this 
in their attempt to mediate, through 
their researches, between an Ursage or 
primal saying sedimented in folk tradi-
tion and a contemporary middle class 
public. Malraux simply denies that the 
mediating elements are there and so 
draws the appropriate consequences. As 
far as the folk art of the past is con-
cerned, some of it, like other past art, 
can be incorporated into the ''imaginary 
museum,'' and appreciated for its styl-
istic and formal values. But there is also 
something that could be thought of as a 
replacement or substitute for folk art, 
















